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I. INTRODUCTION 
In their recent article in the Northwestern University Law Review,1 
Daniel B. Rodriguez and Barry R. Weingast show that expansionist statu-
tory interpretations, like those promoted by dynamic theorists such as Cass 
Sunnstein, William Eskridge, and Jonathan Macey, have resulted in con-
gressional polarization and an inability for Congress to pass landmark, pro-
gressive legislation.2  This essay explores whether Rodriguez and 
Weingast’s warning to dynamic theorists as to the unforeseen consequences 
of judicial expansionist statutory interpretation also applies to Professor 
Einer Elhauge’s theory of statutory interpretation, which is not directly ad-
dressed in Rodriguez and Weingast’s article.3  While dynamic theories gen-
erally urge courts to interpret statutes “in light of their present societal, 
political, and legal context,”4 Elhauge’s theory is unique in that its focus is 
 ∗  Law Clerk to the Honorable Joel M. Flaum, Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.  J.D., 2007 from 
Northwestern University School of Law.  This essay was written as a part of Northwestern’s Constitu-
tional Law Colloquium.  The author would like to thank the instructors of that course—Professors Ste-
ven Calabresi and Andrew Koppelman. 
1  Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Paradox of Expansionist Statutory Interpretations, 
101 NW. U. L. REV. 1207 (2007) (link). 
2  Id. at 1211, 1253–54. 
3  In 2006 Elhauge participated in Northwestern University School of Law’s Constitutional Law Col-
loquium, in which he presented a chapter of his forthcoming book, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES: HOW 
TO INTERPRET UNCLEAR LEGILSATION (forthcoming 2008).  This essay is an outgrowth of Elhauge’s 
talk.  The ideas presented at that discussion are largely mirrored in an earlier article by Elhauge.  See 
Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2027 (2002). 
4  William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1479 
(1997). 
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on the political maximization of the enacting governmental polity.5  Coun-
terintuitively, Elhauge argues that judges can maximize the political prefer-
ences of the enacting governmental polity by interpreting statutory 
ambiguity in accord with the “enactable preferences” of the current gov-
ernment.6  Elhauge also maintains that his theory is much more limited in 
scope than other dynamic theories and cabins undesirable judicial discre-
tion, since the theory only applies in cases of statutory ambiguity and only 
where current enactable preferences are revealed through official action.7 
This Essay analyzes the distinctions that Elhauge draws between his 
theory and those of other dynamic theorists, as well as the limitations he 
places on his “current enactable preferences” default rules, to show that El-
hauge’s theory fails to maximize the political satisfaction of moderate legis-
lators.  Given that failure, this Essay argues that the congressional deadlock 
and polarization described by Rodriguez and Weingast will persist under 
Elhauge’s default rules. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. “The Paradox of Expansionist Statutory Interpretations”: How 
Expansionist Statutory Interpretation Deadlocks and Polarizes Congress 
In their article, Rodriguez and Weingast observe that significant water-
shed legislation is the product of bargaining and compromise, where mod-
erates play a critical role, because neither ardent supporters nor opponents 
usually have the necessary majorities to pass or defeat a bill.8 The authors 
then use positive political theory9 to show that many of the delicate legisla-
 
5  Elhauge, supra note 3, at 2040–48. 
6  Id. at 2084.  Elhauge’s theory tracks “enactable political preferences,” which he defines as “the 
political preferences of the polity that are shared among sufficient elected officials (taking into account 
any requirements for the concurrence of different political bodies like a House and Senate or President) 
that they could and would be enacted into law if the issue were on the legislative agenda.”  Id. at 2034. 
7  Id. at 2102–08. 
8  Rodriguez & Weingast, supra note 1, at 1215–19.  According to Rodriguez and Weingast, exam-
ples of “watershed” statutes include the Civil Rights Act, the Voting Rights Act, and the Clean Air Act.  
Id. at 1207. 
9  In an earlier article, Rodriguez and Weingast provided the following definitional overview of posi-
tive political theory: 
The positive political theory of legislative decision making describes the statute-making process as 
a collection of purposive, strategic decisions made by rational decision makers within the structure 
of legislative institutions.  These legislative institutions are themselves the creation of legislators 
acting to maximize their own varied interests through collective choice mechanisms.  The “indus-
trial organization of Congress” represents the constructed environment within which legislators 
bargain with one another in order to facilitate their individual and collective goals.  Statute—
including both the text of the enacted law and the legislative “history” encoded into the public re-
cord of the statute—reflect not only legislative specialization and expertise, but the vitally impor-
tant object of trade and negotiation.  The legislators’ statements that make up the legislative 
history that attaches to the statute also reflect these important objects.  Critically, the statute’s im-
plementation will be influenced by the meaning given to it by interpretations. 
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tive compromises needed to pass the landmark progressive legislation of the 
1960s and 1970s were undone in that era by courts using expansionist statu-
tory interpretations.10  Rodriguez and Weingast surmise that following these 
court decisions, moderate legislators, now aware of the likelihood that an 
expansionist court will undermine any legislative compromise, vote instead 
to maintain the status quo.11  This explains the increased polarization in 
Congress and its failure to pass significant progressive legislation since the 
1970s.12  It also leads to the paradox that lobbying courts for progressive 
statutory interpretations undermines similar lobbying efforts for progressive 
legislation.13 
Rodriguez and Weingast illustrate their theory—that expansionist judi-
cial interpretations result in the passage of less legislation and greater po-
larization—by using a simple legislative model.14  Rodriguez and Weingast 
posit a basic, seven-person legislature (v1–v7) spread over a left-right po-
litical continuum, with v1–v4 in the majority party and v5–v7 in the minor-
ity party.15  Each legislator then votes according to whether the proposed 











                                                                                                                           
Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of Legislative History: New 
Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Its Interpretation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1417, 1431–32 
(2003) (internal citations omitted).  According to Rodriguez and Weingast, positive political theory pro-
vides “three key insights about legislative behavior”: (1) the theory recognizes the presence of “pivotal, 
moderate legislators” in Congress; (2) the passage of legislation typically involves bargaining between 
“ardent supporters” and moderates; and (3) legislators intentionally create legislative history so as to 
support their view of the statute.  Rodriguez & Weingast, supra note 1, at 1222. 
10  Id. at 1241–50 (pointing to the D.C. Circuit’s interpretation of the National Environment Policy 
Act in Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 
1971) and to interpretations of civil rights legislation, such as in United Steelworkers of America v. We-
ber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979)). 
11  Id. at 1211. 
12  Id. at 1255. 
13  Id. at 1211. 
14  Id. at 1235–41. 
15  Id. at 1236. 
16  Id. 
17  Id. at 1237 (“First Legislative Proposal”). 
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In this scenario, legislators v1–v5 favor the legislation, while v6–v7 
prefer the status quo, resulting in the legislation achieving cloture and pass-
ing.18 
The key insight of Rodriguez and Weingast’s article analyzes what 
would occur if expansionist judicial interpretations of these laws moved the 
legislation a little to the left, to v3’s voting position on the continuum.19  In 
this scenario, the legislation would still command a majority (v1–v4), but 
v5 would now vote to maintain the status quo, therefore rendering the Sen-
ate unable to overcome a filibuster.  Rodriguez and Weingast argue that, 
since legislators are aware that judges will later expand the scope of stat-
utes, legislators will vote according to where they expect the legislation to 
lie on the continuum following judicial expansion, rather than according to 
where the legislation lies when presented to Congress.20  This poses diffi-
culties, not just in forming majorities, but also in obtaining the supermajor-
ity necessary to achieve cloture.21 
Rodriguez and Weingast also observe that Congress becomes more po-
larized when the judiciary expands legislation to more extreme positions on 
the left/right political continuum.22  In the original scenario, v5, a member 
of the minority party, voted moderately with the majority party.  However, 
when legislators modify their votes in anticipation of expansionist statutory 
interpretation, v5 votes with the minority party instead.23  Therefore, expan-
sionist statutory interpretations not only lead moderate legislators to vote 
with greater frequency to maintain the status quo, but also limits the degree 
to which legislators are willing to cross party lines on a given piece of legis-
lation.24 
B. Elhauge’s Statutory Default Rules 
Elhauge claims that judges should employ statutory default rules that 
ensure that statutes are interpreted so as to “accurately reflect enactable po-
litical preferences.”25  In cases where the political preferences of the enact-
ing and current legislative polities differ, Elhauge maintains that the 
 
18  Id. at 1236–37. 
19  Id. at 1238–39. 
20  Id. at 1240–41. 
21  Id. 
22  Id. at 1240. 
23  Id. 
24  Id. at 1239–40. 
25  Elhauge, supra note 3, at 2036, 1240–48.  This Essay focuses on Elhauge’s “preference-
estimating” statutory default rules.  In a companion article, Elhauge discusses how, “when enactable 
preferences are unclear, often the best choice is instead a preference-eliciting default rule that is more 
likely to provoke a legislative reaction that resolves the statutory indeterminacy and thus creates an ul-
timate statutory result that reflects enactable political preferences more accurately than any judicial es-
timate possibly could.”  Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2162, 2165 (2002). 
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political satisfaction of the enacting legislative polity can be maximized by 
interpreting statutory ambiguity in line with the enactable preferences of the 
current polity.26  Elhauge concedes that it seems counterintuitive that judges 
can best maximize the political satisfaction of the enacting legislative polity 
by interpreting all statutes in accord with the enactable preferences of the 
current legislative polity,27 but he defends this assertion by arguing that 
every enacting legislative polity would prefer to have all new and existing 
statutes interpreted in accord with its enactable preferences during its ten-
ure, rather than have its preferences followed indefinitely into the future for 
only those statutes that it enacted.28  The remainder of this Essay will ex-
plore whether Elhauge’s default rule, which utilizes current enactable pref-
erences, maximizes the political satisfaction of congressional moderates—
the group which is the critical focus of Rodriguez and Weingast’s piece. 
III. WHETHER CONGRESSIONAL DEADLOCK AND POLARIZATION 
PERSIST WHEN JUDGES EMPLOY A CURRENT ENACTABLE PREFERENCES 
DEFAULT RULE? 
The remainder of this Essay addresses whether the congressional dead-
lock and polarization described by Rodriguez and Weingast would persist 
under Elhauge’s current enactable preferences default rule.29  In his article, 
Elhauge draws a number of distinctions between his theory and those of 
other dynamic scholars, which he claims provide his theory with a “more 
solid basis, more constraining methodology, and more limited scope” than 
those of other dynamic scholars,30 and also articulates a number of self-
imposed limitations on his current preferences default rule.31  This Section 
 
26  See id. at 2037, 2084.  Elhauge does not provide an exhaustive list of what he considers to be “of-
ficial action,” but does provide that it includes actions by administrative agencies, id. at 2131, and sub-
sequent legislative action and legislative history on the same, or similar legislation to that before the 
court.  Id. at 2112. 
27  Id. at 2037. 
28  Id. at 2084–85. 
29  To the extent that Elhauge’s default rule is, as he claims, already embodied in existing modes of 
statutory interpretation, id. at 2034–35, this analysis could be quite succinct, since Rodriguez and Wein-
gast’s historical analysis would then reflect that Elhauge’s theory leads to the same congressional polari-
zation and deadlock caused by other dynamic theories of statutory interpretation.  However, Elhauge is 
careful to note that his descriptive claim is only that his theory “fits and predicts the doctrine,” not that 
judges say or subjectively think they are applying Elhauge’s default rules.  Id. at 2034–35.  Therefore, 
because Rodriguez and Weingast’s theory of congressional behavior posits that legislators place their 
votes based upon how they expect courts to interpret the statute in the future, it would be unfair to dis-
miss Elhauge’s theory based solely on Rodriguez and Weingast’s historical evidence.  As a result, this 
section will instead focus upon how moderate legislators would respond if they were aware that courts 
would uniformly interpret statutory ambiguity in accord with Elhauge’s default rule. 
30  Id. at 2084. 
31  Id. at 2102–12.  Elhaugue discusses five limitations on his theory: (1) current enactable prefer-
ences should only be applied to resolve statutory ambiguity, not to alter unambiguous statutory meaning; 
(2) the current preferences default rule only applies when action by the current government is unlikely, 
due to “legislative inertia and the costs of enacting legislation,” or delayed; (3) “current preferences 
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will begin by addressing those distinctions and limits that do in fact have 
the potential to avoid the congressional polarization and deadlock that result 
from courts’ application of other dynamic theories.  This Essay will then 
proceed to discuss three reasons why, despite these distinctions, the con-
gressional behavior described by Rodriguez and Weingast will persist.  
First, this Essay will draw attention to the fact that judicial discretion per-
sists under Elhauge’s theory, since Elhauge leaves it to judges to determine 
when a statute is ambiguous.  Next, this Essay will show why the views of 
congressional moderates are marginalized when courts strive to ascertain 
current enactable preferences through “official action” such as a congres-
sional response on similar legislation or administrative agency decisions.  
Finally, this Essay will point out as a more general matter that Elhauge, by 
limiting his default rule’s applicability to the “marginal area where explicit 
legislative action [is] unlikely,”32 undermines the underlying justification 
for his current enactable preferences default rule. 
A. Characteristics of Elhauge’s Default Rule that Serve to Avoid 
Congressional Polarization and Deadlock 
Elhauge strives to distinguish his theory by setting forth important 
limitations on his default rule and by drawing distinctions between his de-
fault rule and other dynamic scholars’ theories.  A number of these limita-
tions and distinctions reflect that Elhauge’s theory has the potential to avoid 
the congressional deadlock and polarization described by Rodriguez and 
Weingast. 
Elhauge criticizes other dynamic theories for the amount of substantive 
judicial judgment they give to the courts.  These dynamic theories instruct 
judges to assess current societal preferences on an issue, and then permit 
judges to further exercise their discretion in determining whether the statute 
should be interpreted in accord with their assessment of general public 
opinion.33  Elhauge points out that his theory does much more to limit judi-
cial discretion, since statutes are only to be interpreted according to the en-
actable preferences of the current legislative polity, binding judges to 
interpret statutory ambiguity to maximize political satisfaction.34 
Elhauge’s default rule is more restrained than those rules proposed by 
other dynamic scholars.  This is illustrated by Rodriguez and Weingast’s 
legislative model’s described earlier in this Essay: 
 
                                                                                                                           
must be truly enactable,” reflecting the requirements of bicameralism and presentment; (4) “current 
preferences must be memorialized in official action,” rather than merely reflected by changes in polls; 
and (5) a legislature could opt-out of Elhauge’s default rule, subject to limitations if the opt-out was too 
self-aggrandizing. 
32  Id. at 2105. 
33  Id. at 2082–83. 
34  Id. at 2082–84. 
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The sentiments in Congress on a particular issue can conceivably 
change over time just as radically as those in society as a whole.  Therefore, 
tracking the legislative polity’s current enactable preferences, rather than 
general societal preferences, does not in and of itself limit how far to the 
left or right on the political continuum a piece of legislation (L1) will shift 
based on a court interpretation.  Elhauge’s theory, however, focuses upon 
maximizing political satisfaction and thereby ensures that an interpretation 
shifting a statute’s (L1’s) position on the political continuum only occurs so 
as to mirror a similar shift in legislators’ (v1–v7) positions along this same 
continuum.  Therefore, Elhauge’s default rule serves to assure legislators 
that the statute will always be reflective of Congress’s view on a particular 
issue.35  Elhauge reiterates this point by emphasizing that under his theory, 
“current preferences must be truly enactable.”36  This limitation prevents 
judges from favoring a particular political party in cases of congressional 
deadlock.37 
Based on these distinctions and limitations, Elhauge’s theory has the 
potential to avoid the congressional deadlock and polarization described by 
Rodriguez and Weingast.  In order for this to truly occur, however, El-
hauge’s theory must ensure that enactable preferences reflect the views of 
congressional moderates often critical to legislation’s passage.  If current 
enactable preferences are gauged by the “cheap talk” of ardent supporters, 
rather than reflecting the compromises these ardent supporters often must 
make with moderates in order to form a viable consensus, then moderate 
legislators will not have confidence in Elhauge’s default rule and congres-
 
35  This assurance reinforces Elhauge’s premise that his theory actually serves to maximize the po-
litical satisfaction of the enacting legislative polity.  See id. at 2040.  This is another distinction between 
Elhauge’s theory and those of other dynamic scholars, which maintain that current public opinion and 
social values should trump enacting legislative preferences.  Id. at 2084. 
36  Id. at 2106 (emphasizing that current preferences, in order to be “truly enactable,” must be able to 
measure up to the requirements of bicameralism and presentment). 
37  Id. 
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sional deadlock and polarization will persist.  Unfortunately, as the rest of 
this Essay reflects, Elhauge’s default rule does not sufficiently account for 
moderate legislators’ perspectives. 
B. Fostering Judicial Discretion in Determining when a Statute is 
Ambiguous 
A key feature that distinguishes Elhauge’s theory from the work of 
other dynamic theorists is that Elhauge’s theory is limited to cases of statu-
tory ambiguity, while other scholars argue that courts should track current 
public opinion, even when this changes a statute’s clear meaning.38  El-
hauge limits his theory to cases of statutory ambiguity because the enacting 
legislature does not have a strong interest in issues of statutory ambiguity.39  
At first blush, it appears that limiting the applicability of the current en-
actable preferences default rule to matters of statutory ambiguity would cor-
respondingly limit the degree to which moderates shift to more polarized 
voting behavior.  Because the rule lessens the degree to which judges can 
change the statute from its original form, this restriction to cases of ambigu-
ity reduces the number of moderates who will change their vote.  This is 
borne out in Figure 3, below, where L1 represents the legislation as passed 
by Congress, LD represents the maximum a statute can be expanded under 
dynamic theories that are not limited to areas of statutory ambiguity, and 
 
38  Id. at 2084, 2102–03. 
39  Id. at 2103.  Elhauge uses this same argument to show why his default rule should apply to water-
shed, landmark legislation.  Elhauge argues that even the enacting legislative polities of landmark civil 
rights and voting rights acts of the 1960s would prefer his current enactable preferences default rule.  Id. 
at 2091–92.  Elhauge supports this argument by contending that even if the enacting polity had a height-
ened interest in the legislation it passed, this would not similarly extend to ambiguities in the statute, 
since such ambiguities are largely the product of either “an unforeseen issue, an intentional failure to 
decide, or so little interest in the issue that the legislature was unwilling to incur the decisionmaking 
costs of resolving it.”  Id. at 2091.  Rodriguez and Weingast’s theory, however, calls into question El-
hauge’s claim that legislators do not have a strong interest in statutory ambiguity.  Rodriguez and Wein-
gast discuss, for example, how courts have undone many of the critical compromises struck between 
ardent supporters and moderates with respect to civil rights legislation.  Rodriguez & Weingast, supra 
note 1, at 1248–49.  The importance of these bargains in securing civil rights laws’ passage undermines 
Elhauge’s treatment of statutory ambiguity as consisting of unforeseen issues and those of little interest 
to legislators.  The one area where Elhauge’s theory may hold true is with respect to intentionally in-
cluded ambiguity, so long as both the ardent supporters and moderates on a piece of legislation pur-
posely included such ambiguity.  This again reflects the importance of considering moderates’ views, 
since, as Rodriguez and Weingast point out, congressional polarization and deadlock persists, even in 
circumstances where a law’s ardent supporters preferred that the statute be interpreted to track current 
legislative preferences.  Id. at 1252.  Moreover, the main these of Rodriguez and Weingast’s article—
that in highly politically charged areas such as civil rights, voting rights, and the environment, Congress 
is unable to pass any significant legislation because expansionist court decisions polarize Congress be-
yond the point of compromise, see discussion supra Part II(A), also undermines Elhauge’s assertion that 
in areas as politically charged as civil rights, the current legislature will likely overturn any statutory in-
terpretation that deviates from current enactable preferences.  Elhauge, supra note 3, at 2091. 
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LE represents the maximum a statute can change when courts are limited to 













Unfortunately, however, Elhauge has failed to clearly define when a 
statute is ambiguous.40  As a result, the description above is far too clean-
cut.  In actuality, the distinction between statutory ambiguity and clear 
meaning is much cloudier than is reflected in the model above.  The lack of 
clarity with respect to whether statutory language is ambiguous provides 
judges an opportunity to exercise discretion so as to maximize their own 
personal political preferences.  Professors Frank B. Cross and Emerson H. 
Tiller documented this phenomenon in an essay that empirically showed 
that judges selectively employed the Chevron doctrine—only triggered in 
cases of statutory ambiguity—so that cases would come out in accord with 
their political preferences.41  Therefore, although Elhauge’s statutory de-
fault rules cabin judicial discretion to when judges are interpreting statutory 
ambiguity, they do nothing to check the judicial discretion in determining 
whether a statute is ambiguous in the first place. 
The fine line between what is and what is not ambiguous statutory lan-
guage calls into question the validity of Elhauge’s claim that enacting legis-
latures do not have a strong interest in areas of statutory ambiguity.42  In 
fact, the inclusion of “ambiguous” statutory language is often the critical 
element for securing a law’s passage, because this language is the result of a 
compromise between the law’s ardent supporters and political moderates.43  
For example, in Calvert Cliffs, the court interpreted the ambiguous word 
 
40  Elhauge stated that he has not offered a definite definition of statutory ambiguity.  Presentation 
by Elhauge to the Northwestern University School of Law’s Constitutional Law Colloquium, in Chi-
cago, Ill. (Apr. 4, 2006).  Similarly, he failed to include such a definition in his earlier Columbia Law 
Review article.  See Elhauge, supra note 3. 
41  Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: 
Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2169 (1998). 
42  Elhauge, supra note 3, at 2103. 
43  Joseph A. Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders: The Value 
of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627, 628 (2002). 
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“appropriate” in the statute’s language to determine whether environmental 
agencies were required to abandon their existing regulations and adopt new 
regulations in accord with the National Environmental Policy Act’s 
(“NEPA”) mandate.44  However, the D.C. Circuit interpreted the statute ex-
pansively, and required that new procedures must be implemented.  This in-
terpretation undermined the fact that, in order to pass NEPA, the law’s 
ardent supporters had to compromise with moderates by insisting that agen-
cies would not be required to abandon existing procedures that served other 
environmental legislation’s purposes.45  Thus, as this example illustrates, 
Elhauge’s claim that the enacting legislature has little interest in areas of 
statutory ambiguity is not a foregone conclusion, particularly with respect 
to landmark, watershed legislation. 
Furthermore, by failing to address when a statute is ambiguous, the 
door remains open for judges to exercise judicial discretion in determining 
whether a term in the statute is clear or ambiguous in the first place.  Judges 
under Elhauge’s theory are able to engage in the same game-playing docu-
mented by Cross and Tiller, so the positioning of LD and LE on the model 
above would be virtually identical.  Elhauge, however, could remedy this 
problem by providing some limits as to when a judge could deem a statute 
ambiguous.  For example, it is questionable how ambiguous a statute is if 
the preferences of the enacting legislative polity are readily ascertainable.  
Therefore, if Elhauge were to limit his current enactable preferences default 
rule to situations where the enacting legislative polity’s preferences are not 
readily ascertainable, this distinction between Elhauge’s and other dynamic 
theories as to when statutes may be interpreted would be much more pro-
nounced and would limit the degree of congressional deadlock and polariza-
tion. 
C. “Current Preferences Must Be Memorialized in Official Action”46 
Another important limit Elhauge places on his current enactable pref-
erences default rule is requiring that current preferences be memorialized in 
“official action.”  Elhauge does this to avoid reliance concerns and to lesson 
error and agency costs.47  Elhauge deems “official action” to include agency 
interpretation of a statute or subsequent, relative legislative action,48 but un-
fortunately, both of these categories of official action alienate congressional 
moderates. 
 
44  Rodriguez & Weingast, supra note 1, at 1245 (citing Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm. v. U.S. 
Atomic Energy Comm’n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1113 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1971)). 
45  Id. at 1247. 
46  Elhauge, supra note 3, at 2107. 
47  Id. 
48  Id. at 2112–56. 
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1. Agency Action—Elhauge views agency interpretation of statutory 
ambiguity as one example of official action for purposes of ascertaining 
current enactable preferences.49  In fact, Elhauge views the Chevron doc-
trine as an example of a current preferences default rule, lending support to 
Elhauge’s descriptive claim that judges already use his statutory default 
rules.50  However, by relying on agency interpretation as a measure of cur-
rent enactable preferences, Elhauge’s theory fails to consider the prefer-
ences of congressional moderates, thereby doing nothing to temper the 
congressional behavior described by Rodriguez and Weingast.  The agen-
cies interpreting statutory ambiguity, although ultimately accountable to 
Congress, are not part of the legislative polity whose political satisfaction 
Elhauge’s theory maximizes.  Further marginalizing moderates is the fact 
that agencies are primarily accountable to the President and oversight com-
mittees rather than to the legislative polity, meaning that the legislature’s 
preferences will not be of primary concern to the agencies.51  In addition, 
there is no guarantee that agencies, if they in fact consider the enactable 
preferences of the legislative polity, consider the supermajority necessary to 
achieve cloture—the part of the legislative process in which moderates 
wield the most power.  As a result, there is no reason that the voting behav-
ior of congressional moderates described by Rodriguez and Weingast would 
be different when courts look to agency action to ascertain current enactable 
preferences. 
2. Subsequent Legislative Action—Under Elhauge’s theory, current 
preferences can also be memorialized in subsequent legislative action.52  
Thus courts can look to subsequent legislative history, embodied in other 
recent statutes, that reflect current enactable preferences on a particular is-
sue.53  To some degree, this official action more reliably reflects the en-
actable preferences of the current legislative polity than looking to agency 
action, since actual action by the legislature is being measured.  However, 
looking at relative legislation still marginalizes the preferences of moderate 
legislators.  Although both the original and recent pieces of legislation may 
speak to the same specific topic, because they are two separate statutes, the 
surrounding context and broader purpose of the laws may very well be dif-
ferent.  Thus, there will invariably be fine distinctions between the statute 
that the court is interpreting and the relative legislative act on a different 
piece of legislation that the court is using to ascertain current enactable 
preferences.  While these nuanced differences will generally not have an 
impact on the voting behavior of those legislators who toe their respective 
 
49  Id. at 2126. 
50  Id. at 2126–31. 
51  See id. at 2127–28. 
52  Id. at 2115–21. 
53  Id. at 2115–16 (arguing that courts looking to subsequent legislative history is largely descriptive, 
but noting that it is something that courts already do). 
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party lines, for moderates the slightest shift in a law to the political right or 
left could change their vote.54  Under Elhauge’s default rule, courts could 
look to a newly enacted piece of legislation (LC) to determine the current 
enactable preferences regarding a particular provision in an older statute 
currently before the court for interpretation.  However, the individual provi-
sions in the current legislation will not all lie at the same place on the politi-
cal spectrum as the statute as a whole, and instead the statute will reflect a 
combination of both slightly leftward (P1) and slightly rightward (P2) lean-













In this example, the legislation as a whole (LC) will achieve cloture 
and be enacted by Congress, but a particular provision in the statute, P1, 
would not successfully obtain cloture or be enacted if voted upon on its 
own, because v5’s vote would be different.  As a result, reliance on relative 
legislative action as an indication of current enactable preferences maxi-
mizes the political satisfaction of the majority of legislators who lean 
strongly towards the political left or right, but fails to account for moderates 
who would have changed their vote based on the overall context of the law.  
Under Rodriguez and Weingast’s model, these moderates, realizing that 
their preferences are marginalized under the current enactable preferences 
rule, will be less inclined to compromise in the future, leading to congres-
sional deadlock and polarization. 
D. “Relevance Normally Limited to Marginal Area Where Explicit 
Legislative Action Unlikely”55 
Finally, Elhauge emphasizes that his current enactable preferences de-
fault rule only applies in the limited situation where the preferences of the 
current legislative polity are enactable, but have not been passed into law 
due to the force of legislative inertia, the cost in enacting legislation, or the 
 
54  This is reflected in Rodriguez and Weingast’s legislative models.  Supra Part II(A). 
55  Id. at 2105. 
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delay before legislation actually takes effect.56  Although this limitation 
counters the argument that the enacting legislative polity would not prefer 
this default rule because the current legislative polity could always override 
interpretations of past legislation with which it disagreed,57 it also under-
mines the basic rationale for implementing a current enactable preferences 
default rule in the first place. 
Elhauge contends that the enacting legislative polity would prefer that 
its enactable preferences be tracked for all cases of statutory uncertainty 
arising during its tenure rather than preserving its preferences only for statu-
tory ambiguity in the legislation it enacted.58  However, by limiting the de-
fault rule’s reach to the “marginal area where explicit action by the current 
government is unlikely or delayed,”59 Elhauge limits the number of cases of 
statutory interpretation in which this default rule is applicable.  Therefore, 
Elhauge’s focus on the current legislative polity’s ability to influence the in-
terpretation of all statutes is misleading to the extent that the current legisla-
tive polity is only able to affect the statutory interpretation of statutes where 
explicit legislative action is unlikely.  By limiting his default rule’s applica-
bility to this “marginal area,” Elhauge undermines the very justification for 
his default rule in the first place, that the enacting legislative polity would 
prefer to have its preferences tracked for all statutes during its tenure rather 
than only for those statutes which it enacted.  It is uncertain whether con-
gressional moderates, and indeed the legislature as a whole, would prefer 
Elhauge’s default rule given this limitation on its applicability. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Although Elhauge’s current enactable preferences default rule is based 
on maximizing the political satisfaction of the enacting legislative polity, 
the rule fails to achieve this goal with respect to the preferences of moderate 
legislators.  As a result, despite Elhauge’s efforts to distinguish his theory 
from those of other dynamic theorists, the application of Elhauge’s current 
enactable preferences default rule by the courts would lead to congressional 
deadlock and polarization with respect to landmark, progressive legislation, 
as described by Rodriguez and Weingast.   
Elhauge fails to sufficiently limit his current enactable preferences de-
fault rule or distinguish his theory from those of other dynamic scholars for 
purposes of avoiding Rodriguez and Weingast’s conclusion, but Elhauge 
could modify his theory to minimize congressional deadlock and polariza-
tion.  One critical way in which Elhauge could do this is by defining when a 
statutory term is ambiguous.  Elhauge could also modify his current en-
 
56  Id. 
57  Id. 
58  Id. at 2084–85. 
59  Id. at 2105. 
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actable preferences default rule to further limit what qualifies as “official 
action” for purposes of memorializing current enactable preferences.   
Elhauge’s default rule utilizing current enactable preferences does a 
great deal to limit judicial discretion and is commendable for its effort to 
maximize political satisfaction.  Unless Elhauge makes such modifications 
to his current enactable preferences default rule, however, his theory fails to 
respect the delicate compromises fashioned by legislative moderates that 
are often critical to a law’s passage.  As a result, Elhauge’s default rule fails 
to limit the congressional deadlock and polarization with respect to land-
mark, progressive legislation described by Rodriguez and Weingast. 
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